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Abstract 
 
Sexuality-based refugee claims constitute an expanding area of legal practice and 
scholarship. This expansion in the field of refugee law mirrors international efforts to 
address homophobia in various sites around the globe, and in legal terms, this has 
predominantly taken the form of rights-based protections, such as decriminalising same-sex 
sexual acts as a matter of civil and political rights. The strategies of addressing sex-, gender- 
and sexuality-based oppression in the context of free movement on one hand and 
constitutional protections on the other share a common set of tensions and dilemmas, and 
both risk re-inscribing fundamental aspects of the very violence that they each seek to 
address. This article asks what it might mean to ‘queer’ refugee law, particularly in the 
context of its dynamic relationship with the discourse of decriminalisation. The article takes 
forward the centrality of sexual politics within the moral economy of migration regulation 
and attempts to approach it with the methodological impulse and transformative potential 
that ‘queer’ suggests. 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
“In the context of contemporary projects of security and state violence, lesbian 
and gay rights discourse occupies a recuperative role for institutions and 
practices long contested by anti-racist, anti-colonial, feminist and queer 
intellectual traditions and social movements.”1 
 
Nearly five years ago, in 2010, the UK Supreme Court rendered a watershed decision in HT 
& HJ v. Secretary of State for the Home Office, eliminating what has been described as the 
‘discretion test’2 for gay and lesbian refugees and calling attention to the challenges that had 
been faced by claimants applying for sexuality-based asylum in the UK. Alongside this 
decision, and for years prior to it, scholars and practitioners had been documenting and 
theorising some of the particular challenges facing gay and lesbian asylum seekers in Europe, 
Commonwealth countries and elsewhere.
3
 There have also been important judgments on 
sexual-orientation-based asylum handed down on the European level in the intervening years, 
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including the Joined Cases of X, Y, and Z
4
 and A, B, and C
5
 at the Court of Justice of the 
European Union and the case of ME v. Sweden at the European Court of Human Rights in 
Strasbourg.
6
 Discussing sexual rights among international and migration lawyers and 
activists, by virtue of the material necessity of country reports and context-based evidence 
from claimants’ countries of origin, has shuttled constantly between sexual rights and refugee 
rights, and in the past few years, this tension has been teased out before a wide and attentive 
public. The liberal or leftist approach has been mainly to view recent expansion of the scope 
of protection of gay and lesbian refugees as a step in the right direction, towards protection of 
basic human rights and, in the case of HT and HJ, a more appropriate way to conceive of 
persecution on the basis of sexuality than the so-called discretion test had been. However, 
whilst this judgment has been regarded as mainly a positive advancement for protecting 
individuals fleeing sexuality-based persecution, aspects of such asylum claims reveal ways in 
which such advancements serve to reinforce and discipline not only sex-sexuality-gender 
norms, but also cultural stereotypes, as well as our core assumptions about the goals and 
limitations of the refugee law system. Such advancements are shifts in the legal regulation of 
refugee status that, just below the surface, re-instantiate professional and disciplinary 
expectations not to address certain issues that are critical to understanding sexuality both in 
the context of defining persecution as well as in articulating the global justice aims of the 
international refugee law system. The HT and HJ moment, then, marks an appropriate time to 
ask what it would mean to ‘queer’ refugee law.   
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By ‘queer’ I am referring to what James Hathaway and Jason Pobjoy discuss in their 
important article on HT and HJ called “Queer Cases Make Bad Law”, wherein the term 
‘queer’ recalls ‘overtly political challenge’ to the assimilationist politics inherent in 
expectations of refugee claimants’ narratives of sexual selfhood and gender identity.7 I agree 
with Hathaway and Pobjoy, that cases such as HT and HJ, while they seem to protect asylum 
applicants more completely, force applicants to couch their claims in conventional culturally-
specific western terminology (e.g., through use of the terms ‘homosexual’ and ‘gay’ to 
describe sexuality) and do not challenge normative conceptions of sexuality.
8
 However, on a 
more fundamental level, I depart from Hathaway and Pobjoy and contend that cases like HT 
and HJ are not ‘queer’ cases with regard to critically conceptualising refugee law. Such cases 
reproduce language and legal ideologies that engender a strict Western view not only of 
sexuality and gender, but also of culture, race, history and the geopolitics of violence. While 
Hathaway and Pobjoy do not set out to engage with the term ‘queer’ in their article in this 
way, I would like to take up the analytic lens that the deployment of such a term can provide.   
The other aspect of ‘queer’ that I am referring to is what Jack Halberstam proposes 
with the idea of a queer methodology. Halberstam notes,  
 
“A queer methodology, in a way, is a scavenger methodology that 
uses different methods to collect and produce information on subjects 
who have been deliberately or accidentally excluded from traditional 
studies of human behavior. The queer methodology attempts to 
combine methods that are often cast as being at odds with each other, 
and it refuses the academic compulsion toward disciplinary 
coherence.”9 
 
While Halberstam deploys the idea of a queer methodology as it relates to the study of human 
behaviour, I apply it in considering refugee law, both in theory and in practice. As 
theoreticians, we are disciplined to regard refugee law as the best solution for those fleeing 
persecution. Given the current geopolitical order, it represents the best of many evils, or, 
given the near-impossibility of the devolution of borders and states, the possible among 
impossibilities. As practitioners we realise that, whatever critiques of the refugee law system 
we may advance outside of court, when before a tribunal and navigating the strait-laced 
gauntlet of legal techniques necessary to achieve a positive refugee status determination for a 
client, it is at best impractical to mention the critical perspective one might otherwise have 
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towards refugee law. It would be disorienting and, some will certainly argue, unrealistic to 
reject disciplinary coherence, particularly in the case of legal advocacy—one will not win a 
case if one blatantly ignores the mechanics of the legal claim. The present analysis is meant as 
a provocation to reassess the desired outcome of refugee law by unsettling some of its core 
assumptions. 
Europe in general and the UK more specifically serve as a suitable window into this 
intervention for a number of reasons. This text is meant to be self-reflective, considering both 
activist and academic entry into the issue of refugee law and its relationship to activism 
around decriminalisation of same-sex sexual activity. The UK plays a central role in global 
discussions on decriminalisation, given its prominence as the administrative and political 
head of the Commonwealth. In the particular context of repression of sexual diversity, the 
UK has left behind a trail of criminal legal provisions, outlawing same-sex sexual activity in 
former colonial territories. Two relatively recent examples of renewal of these laws are the 
affirmation of the constitutionality of Section 377 of the Indian Penal Code by the Supreme 
Court of India
10
 and expansion of similar laws into harsher ones by the parliament of 
Uganda.
11
 Additionally, due to the publicity of recent UK case law regarding sexuality and 
gender-based refugee claims, most notably the HT and HJ decision,
12
 the UK has become a 
locus for discussing LGBTIQ
13
 refugee issues in Europe and beyond.   
 
1.1. Sexuality-based asylum and decriminalisation of same sex activity 
While refugee law is concerned essentially with helping individuals gain residency rights in a 
foreign territory in order to escape state-sponsored or state-complicit persecution,
14
 the 
international promotion of human rights law is primarily concerned with securing varying 
degrees of constitutional human rights protection within individual nation-states. In the case 
of the rights of LGBTIQ claimants, refugee protection and international efforts to increase 
human-rights-based protection in national constitutional settings are carried out with largely 
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different processes, but share a common set of discourses, challenges and dangers.
15
 It is 
important to reflect upon the two strands of work with a common frame of reference in order 
to best understand the contingencies that undergird them both.    
Asylum lawyers in immigration tribunals are primarily concerned with securing 
refugee status for individual applicants in receiving countries, rather than with attempting to 
change the conditions in applicants’ countries of origin, although the persecution is often 
immediately related to these conditions. The most direct reason for this is that refugee cases, 
like other cases, are scripted for answering certain legal questions to the exclusion of other 
potentially related questions. The presumption is that, within the set of human rights-based 
remedies available to refugees, determining the official refugee status of an applicant is 
largely independent of related social change activism that seeks to alter the conditions that 
make protection necessary in the first place—or at least such discussions are not thought to 
be appropriate in the courtroom. 
The concern of the refugee lawyers advocating for increased protections for LGBTIQ 
refugees is to prove that claimants are being persecuted on the basis of sexuality, as defined 
and understood by applicable case law or, alternatively, to change the way the case law is 
interpreted to the same effect. Meanwhile, queer theorists and those concerned with the 
limited sense in which sexuality is discussed in both these contexts remind us that sexuality, 
in many people’s lived experience, is not limited to binary self-identification in terms of sex, 
gender and sexuality. Numerous advocates and academics are active in both international 
decriminalisation of same-sex sexual activity and LGBTIQ refugee claims advocacy, though 
perhaps in different capacities and fora.   
There is a professional expectation that these two strands of advocacy be kept 
separate. A refugee status determination hearing or immigration tribunal is not a receptive 
venue for debating the limits of geo-politics as a conceptual framework for organising 
violence, as this lies outside of the framework categories familiar to the judges. The 
framework used in refugee claims is, as discussed, firmly rooted in the logic of politically-
defined borders, jurisdictions and corresponding cultural and social attitudes. However, the 
discourses related to decriminalisation and refugee protection share common terms, including 
‘culture’, ‘human rights’, and ‘safety’, as well as various ideological renderings of Europe as 
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a benevolent safe haven for new (non-European)
16
 migrants. Paying careful attention to the 
global dynamics of ‘racism’ in the sense to which Grosfoguel refers (particularly in respect of 
those in the zones of non-being) and conditions that echo colonial and other divides (beyond 
simply the North-South divide or the West-Rest divide) will enable one to view the 
connections and to be wary of the types of interventions that exacerbate the conditions in 
these spaces of precariousness rather than catalyse an empowering set of tools, logics and 
frameworks.   
There are also challenges that accompany the specialised nature of advocacy and 
rights-based social change activism. The activist working on decriminalisation may lobby 
national government, liaise with NGOs where same-sex sexual activity is criminalised, lend 
financial support, initiate educational campaigns, and demonstrate solidarity with local 
groups and individual activists. The legal practitioner (also an activist – the distinction is 
arbitrary to some degree, but it is important to note that different discursive and professional 
expectations govern different types of practice) may, among other things, create legal 
historiography, lend specialised assistance to local organisations, and even strategically 
litigate through constitutional challenge, in partnership with local organisations. None of 
these are straightforward strategies and they each approach social change in different ways.     
Regardless of strategy, it remains that human rights law reform considers the law in a 
broad context, while refugee law considers local laws and their contexts to a relatively 
limited extent. When discussing constitutional law reform and national policy, the context of 
the laws and their development is central to negotiating the historical and social 
contingencies that define change and determine political strategy. Thus, when considering 
decriminalisation, one unavoidable topic
17
 is the role of empire in developing and 
disseminating colonial laws, among them laws prohibiting gay sex. However, in the context 
of refugee law, the discussion of laws is limited to their direct support of the particular 
persecution faced by the individual claimant.    
 
 
2.  Comfort Zones and Death Zones 
There is a dual aesthetic that shapes both the study and practice of refugee law which can be 
summarised as a self-reinforcing polarity of comfort and death. This polarity refers mainly to 
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how we regard the ideological and material substance of refugee claims, but it also describes 
how we view ourselves in light of the total predicament of the refugee system, including the 
conditions that necessitate such a system. I will begin with a reflection on the concept of 
‘comfort’.   
The type of comfort that I mean is two-fold. First, there is the comfort that many 
advocates and scholars have in the assumption that legal logics adequately describe social 
realities. For example, there is comfort with human rights discourse that arranges the world 
into geopolitical realms of safety and danger. In the case of the rights of LGBTIQ individuals 
this cartography is, at its most overt, expressed with the evolution narrative that extends from 
criminalisation of gay sex to recognition of same-sex marriage, entrenching a linear rights 
model within the familiar civilising discourse of social ‘progress’. Beyond the problematic 
use of an evolutionary schema, what is presumed to be the furthest point of progression in the 
schema is recognition of same-sex marriage, which can also be critiqued as an unimaginative, 
violent institution, advocacy for which has relegated other issues affecting a broad range of 
queer people and people of colour to the political margins.
18
 This advances a flat, 
impoverished picture of society—using the parameters of rights and rights-granting national 
jurisdictions, rather than a lived reality full of contingencies and power relations that shape 
not only experiences of sexuality, but experiences of location at the junctions of law, politics, 
gender, sexuality, race, class, etc. Comfort with this language of rights also allows what 
Nadine El-Enany has referred to as ‘legal idolatry,’19 or the belief that where rights exist, 
justice is bound to follow, rather than viewing a myriad of other exclusionary administrative 
measures  that exist alongside rights as technologies for curtailing material or substantive 
benefits for disenfranchised people on the other end.   
The other type of comfort that I mean is the comfort that accompanies adherence to 
disciplinary or professional discourses by practitioners and advocates. The advocate for 
LGBTIQ refugees in this scenario, whether lawyer, activist or policy champion, attempts to 
widen the scope of protection for LGBTIQ refugees by identifying gaps in coverage, or 
advocating for one particular person to gain asylum, while generally maintaining the 
legitimacy of the refugee system.
20
 While practitioners in the courtroom advocate for singular 
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clients, some cases, such as HT and HJ, can result in significant shifts in jurisprudence.
 21
   
However, the situations that prompted the persecution are met with the decriminalisation 
strategy taken by other lawyers and activists, many of whom know one another, are active in 
the same circles, or occasionally also do refugee work. Even in the context of this strategy, 
refugee law is regarded as better than nothing, though it is essentially a superficial quick-fix 
solution that can and should be made obsolete by a more sustainable transformation of the 
conditions of persecution. But to follow the metaphor to a further stage, what is the source of 
persecution or extreme violence more broadly? Does thinking of a singular source already 
oversimplify the contingencies of structural violence faced by people owing to their 
sexuality, gender or any other grounds? Does thinking in accordance with the professional 
disciplinary expectations of refugee law or constitutional revision regarding sexual activity or 
identity commit us to the tunnel vision of single-issue provincialism and risk the 
compounding of problems in other areas of social life? There is comfort in not answering or, 
better, not asking these questions. This comfort allows us to focus on the ‘positive’—the 
refugee system allows those privileged enough to cross a border, and often the sea, to ask for 
protection and get it.
22
 It allows us as academics, activists and practitioners, to defer to the 
current system, as it unarguably saves lives while politically viable alternatives are curtailed 
by a deeply entrenched global infrastructure for policing movement. It is with the discomfort 
posed by these questions that I shift to discuss the concept of death. 
If the promise of comfort is central to the refugee law system, then the spectre of 
death is the other atrium of the system’s discordant heart. The title of this paper is borrowed 
from Balibar’s idea of ‘death zones’.23 With this concept, Balibar reminds us that spaces 
defined by extreme violence exist within Europe, not only outside of it. This is to be seen as a 
corollary to the assumption that Europe is a zone of safety and that refugees abroad will flee 
persecution over there to enjoy a haven right here. In “Outlines of a Topography of Cruelty”, 
Balibar inverts the typical narrative of Europe as the place synonymous with human rights 
and safety by pointing to the extreme violence that occurs within Europe against those 
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without European citizenship and, thus, without the full protection of a European state.
24
 In 
describing these zones, he argues:  
 
“In the end it would be my suggestion that the ‘g[l]obalization’ of various 
kinds of extreme violence has produced a tendential division of the 
‘globalized’ world into life-zones and death zones. Between these zones 
(which indeed are intricate, frequently reproduced within the boundaries of 
single country or city), there exists a decisive and fragile superborder, which 
raises fears and concerns about the unity and division of mankind – 
something like a global and local ‘enmity line,’ like the ‘amity line’ which 
existed in the beginning of the modern European seizure of the world. It is 
this superborder, this enmity line, that becomes at the same time an object of 
permanent show and a hot place for intervention. But also for 
nonintervention.”25   
 
Here, Balibar describes “extreme violence” as geopolitically “without borders or beyond 
borders” rather than “violence of the border”. This is important, as it suggests that locating 
the violence of refugee law at the border (and we are familiar with the trope of border 
violence that frames a great deal of refugee work in Europe—illustrative phrases like ‘the 
guarded gate’, ‘the treacherous sea’, ‘Fortress Europe’ easily come to mind) limits more 
thorough consideration of violence as it fails to recognise more pervasive and widespread 
violence within the borders and beyond the borderline. The superborder framework for 
identifying violence considers extreme violence to be something that is not shaped solely by 
the policing of the political boundaries of the state, but also inter-subjective and inter-
institutional domains that can exist within the nation and even within cities and localities.
26
    
Public discourse with regard to threateningly large refugee ‘flows’ into Europe and 
the parallel vernacular of ‘saving’ the refugees regularly deployed in media discourse relating 
to refugees does not mirror the lived reality of many refugees and asylum seekers. For many 
without European citizenship, the obstacles to accessing a better life in Europe can be another 
hell with different wallpaper. We know from the experiences shared by many refugees of the 
perils in Europe, from drowning on the high seas
27
 to abuse private enforcement agents,
28
 to 
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living in destitution if one’s claim is rejected.29 Both the journey and the destination are zones 
of danger for the precarious condition of entering Europe as a refugee.
30
 The lived reality of 
these death zones exist within the shadows of the refugee law Leitmotif of rescue that, in my 
account, constitutes the comfort zone in which we as advocates working from within Europe 
and the United States, and in my case, the United Kingdom, imagine ourselves. In the context 
of refugee law, the concept of the ‘death zone’ requires us to look critically at the supposed 
‘location’ of human rights, the violence from within Europe, but also the violence of 
citizenship in general, and specifically, the violence done by European citizenship.  
What might be gained from reorienting our framing of refugee law with a queer 
perspective, rejecting for a moment the ‘compulsion towards disciplinary coherence’?31  
What creative potential might we unlock by thinking about this ‘cartography’ of safety and 
danger, using Balibar’s notion of the ‘death zone’32 and reflecting on the concepts of “zones 
of being and non-being,” as articulated by Fanon33 and interpreted by Ramón Grosfoguel and 
others?
34
 It may help us identify shortcomings of refugee law as well as dangers of a silo-
approach to sexuality rights as a form of ‘homonationalism’35 in the context of refugee law.    
Jasbir Puar, in Terrorist Assemblages, introduces the concept of homonationalism as 
the “imbrications of American exceptionalism [...] increasingly marked through or aided by 
certain homosexual bodies.”36 This concept has been applied outside of the context of 
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American exceptionalism to other contexts in which states have bolstered their own particular 
forms of exceptionalism through the instrumentalisation of gay rights.
37
 I would like to 
suggest that the refugee context provides fertile ground for examining this concept as it 
relates to the maintenance of a commitment to geographical organisation of spaces of 
violence and salvation. The refugee context also provides a window for viewing the 
appropriation of refugee stories in an effort to appropriate the violence that occurs ‘over 
there’ as a politics of renewed violence against all of those in countries imputed to be 
persecutory. 
 
3.  First Rupture:  The Problem with Mapping 
 
Both efforts to globally decriminalise same-sex sexual activity as well as refugee law 
advocacy attempt to know the subject and to locate the subject in a schema of relative 
violence or safety, comfort or death. This ‘knowing’ involves a process of mapping, both in 
terms of a corporeal and psychological mapping of the refugee subject as well as a global 
geopolitical mapping of culture and society.    
 
3.1.  Anti-queer Knowing 
The structure of rights-based remedies, whether constitutional reform or refugee protection, 
force us as advocates to reckon with the “paradox of rights” as discussed by Wendy Brown, 
with which she refers to our frustration with rights-based approaches as we observe and 
criticise the systems of structural power in which rights are articulated and executed.
38
 In 
describing one aspect of the “paradox of rights,” in relation to contemplating remedies to 
gender violence, Brown argues:  
 
“Rights function to articulate a need, a condition of lack or injury, that 
cannot be fully redressed or transformed by rights, yet within existing 
political discourse can be signified in no other way. Thus rights for the 
systematically subordinated tend to rewrite injuries, inequalities, and 
impediments to freedom that are consequent to social stratification as 
matters of individual violations and rarely articulate the conditions 
producing or fomenting that violation. Yet the absence of rights in these 
domains leaves fully intact these same conditions.”39 
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Brown describes the basic dilemma of rights for people in positions of relative 
disempowerment as both freeing from and constitutive of systematic gender oppression. One 
aspect of this is that rights, as a framework for identifying remedies, define injuries (and, by 
extension, allow what is beyond the scope of such definition to fall outside of the coverage of 
the right). Rights are also constructed in relation to a predetermined recipient. In her example 
of women’s rights, Brown considers various constructions of ‘woman’ that are made in order 
to secure certain rights, but notes that relying on women’s equality to men may further 
entrench the subordination of women by relying on a fictional subject position (women, who 
are granted the ‘rights of men’) and by fracturing women along the lines that divide their 
lives in other ways, including “racial, class, sexual and gendered power”.40 
  This type of rights dilemma or “paradox” also describes the situation of LGBTIQ 
people claiming refugee status, in Europe, for example. Protection of trans and queer 
applicants does not feature in the judgments on same-sex applicants, though there are shared 
forms of gender and sexuality oppression inherent in persecution of such applicants. In order 
to gain asylum, one must convince a judge that one is being persecuted on the basis of her 
sexuality, which may mean articulating one’s story in a way that conforms to the expectations 
of the judge, including what the judge understands as sexuality. This may express itself by 
way of an essentialised understanding of how a lesbian or gay man is ‘supposed’ to act, speak 
or behave.
41
 This essentialising produces a stereotype that erases potentially decisive 
differences among those from different contexts who might be applying for asylum. For 
example, the fact of having had sex with a person of the opposite sex or having been involved 
in a heterosexual relationship neither precludes being gay or lesbian (or bisexual or otherwise 
not exclusively heterosexual), nor does it necessarily safeguard an applicant from being 
perceived as gay or lesbian.
42
 However, such an assumption that heteronormative gender 
roles and same-sex sexual desire are somehow mutually exclusive still exists among 
adjudicators.    
The applicant’s body is inspected in visceral ways in the course of mapping out 
sexuality. In some of the more extreme cases in Europe, ‘evidence’ of sexual desire has been 
procured by way of plethysmography (an attempt to scientifically measure sexual arousal 
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through visual stimuli and attaching electrodes to the genitals).
43
 More routinely, at least in 
the UK, asylum applicants feel pressure to prove their sexuality according to sex-act-based 
criteria, sometimes submitting videos and photographs into evidence to prove their identities 
through sex acts.
44
 Others feel that they must render verbal accounts of their sexual 
encounters or participation in same-sex relationships.  One cannot help but to imagine these 
various forms of bodily inspection as a part of the economy of morality and sexual politics 
that shapes other aspects of the allocation of human rights—it is one that assigns value to a 
certain type of subject, a certain form of story, particular forms of evidence, and a certain 
narrative of (the body’s relation to) danger. Of course, this is not peculiar to the LGBTIQ 
refugee, though in the LGBTIQ narrative, the body and its sexual potentialities take on an 
undeniable centrality. 
In reading the body for its sexual potentiality, its relationship to a legible narrative 
and to an imagined space, the body is positioned not only sexually but racially, culturally and 
politically. The act of reading and assessing the body, aside from reconstructing a colonial 
scene where resources and bodies are carefully balanced in an economy of labour, fear and 
desire, also constructs the world and power through the lens of empire. In other words, the 
gaze of knowing cast upon the body is a colonial gaze, invested in policing the body as much 
as policing resources and geopolitical integrity.
45
  
 
3.2. Failures of Geopolitical Logics 
Global efforts to repeal various countries’ national laws criminalising same-sex sexual 
activity are often invested in a related mapping project around human rights—one that slices 
the world into domains of protection and violence. ‘Decriminalisation’ as a global co-
ordination of political and legal reform efforts is also, like any other such project, a discursive 
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one. Focus on criminal laws, then, as a central mode of social change starts down a path with 
a particular ideological trajectory and scope. This can be posited as a naming-and-shaming 
project, or as a legal tool for mapping the current state of the law in each country.
46
 While 
maps emphasise a way of thinking about legal and political battles regarding repressive laws 
as fought along the borders of states, which can itself be problematic in the ways that Balibar 
suggests with the idea of the superborder, it is not only the graphic representation that creates 
the danger of retrenchment of organising violence around geopolitical borders.
47
 One danger 
of thinking of violence as a function of state assemblage rather than in accordance with what 
Fanon refers to as ‘zones of being’ and ‘zones of non-being’48 is that it reproduces a public 
civilising discourse, one that uses states’ laws as a proxy for the composite repression within 
the state. Of course, repressive laws have a violent effect, and one should not ignore these 
laws as instruments of social repression. Also, it is useful for refugee practitioners to 
understand what countries will, at least partly by virtue of their laws serve as willing recipient 
countries for refugees. However, one should be critical of using law as a proxy for the 
possibility of violence for a few reasons.   
First, and very practically, focusing on the laws as a proxy for violence highlights the 
violence done by the state and risks trivialising other forms of violence. This is especially 
true in the context of the decriminalisation project. For example, violence against women in 
South Africa is legally prohibited in South Africa, but it is nonetheless commonplace.
49
 As it 
happened, certain refugee cases in the UK had relied on a map published by ILGA in order to 
either affirm or negate the likelihood that persecution was taking place in particular countries 
based on whether the state had criminalised same-sex sexual activity or provided protections 
for LGBTIQ people.
50
 Although it is currently being discussed, criminalisation of same-sex 
sexual activity has not often been interpreted to constitute per se persecution. Conversely, a 
lack of criminal prohibition of gay sex does not negate the presence of persecution, not least 
of all because persecution can be perpetrated by non-state actors.
51
 This is an important 
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distinction, and although any refugee law practitioner should know this, it can be taken 
advantage of in the battle to persuade the presiding judge of the likelihood of state complicity 
or inability to protect. For this reason, ILGA included a section addressed to refugee 
practitioners in the forward of the most recent reports on State-Sponsored Homophobia to 
make this distinction clear.
52
 
A second example of the violence that is left invisible in the project of mapping when 
law is a proxy is homophobic and trans-phobic violence in Europe, where various far-
reaching protections exist. Here, it is not that the violence in Europe therefore goes 
unaddressed, but rather that violence elsewhere is depicted as a socio-cultural problem that 
others have but that Europe does not. This re-instantiates fears that fuel stereotypes about 
Africa and Islam. It also orients ways of being in one’s sexuality in a Eurocentric way, 
drawing quite a flat picture of sexuality.
53
 In the process of essentialising postcolonial 
societies, mapping along political borders can also oversimplify and misrepresent other 
patterns of violence, for example, regional or localised violence owing to regional instability 
that leads to what migration scholars refer to as internal displacement.
54
 
The cartography of spaces and taxonomies of people and culture in the spirit of 
knowing for the purpose of disseminating rights in a moral, political and material economy is 
anti-queer. It reifies Eurocentric ideas of sexuality and culture and supports the saviour 
narrative of human rights now, subtly re-inscribing borders and the legitimacy of brutal 
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restrictions on movement. It also masks systems of power responsible for violence within and 
beyond the borders. 
 
4.  Second Rupture:  The Problem with Human Rights 
Frantz Fanon dislocates violence from geopolitics and instead describes zones of ‘being and 
non-being’, which can be present anywhere and are contingent on power relations beyond 
state repression.
55
 Fanon is explicit in his description of this zone of nonbeing as a type of 
hell, a space for the non-human.
56
 Though in Black Skin, White Masks Fanon limits his 
observations to the French Antilles,
57
 he makes observations about the structural continuities 
among colonial societies and extends those observations in The Wretched of the Earth. In this 
volume, Fanon notes that the violence of colonialism is violence that continues to regulate the 
actions and resistance of colonized people, and he insists that this persists even after 
geopolitical colonialism has ended. He notes that “[t]o break up the colonial world does not 
mean that after the frontiers have been abolished lines of communication will be set up 
between the two zones.” He also notes that there are some colonized elites who politically 
purchase their ways into positions of power between settler colonials and natives, in the case 
of settler colonialism in Africa.
58
 
The intent focus on political power, coloniality, and racism inherent in Fanon’s 
framing of violence in “zones of being and nonbeing” gives us a different way to look at 
refugee law that goes in a different direction from the national-cultural framework that is 
typically used to assess country situations for refugees.
59
 Verdirame rightly argues that 
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refugee law is an area of immense political contestation because “implicit in any grant of 
asylum is a censure of the country of origin of the refugee.”60 He notes the slippage that is 
apparent in the process of granting asylum, from offering a ‘place of refuge’ to advancing 
values that are, in the tradition of human rights, steeped in the language of ‘culture’, and as a 
function of nation-state thinking, reliant on a basic geopolitics of cultural or social morality.    
The latter point, along with its allusion to a more profound critique of sovereignty 
(not addressed in this article) sets the backdrop for a more careful approach to viewing 
oppression and repression. First, those in political power should not be seen as representative 
of culture in such a way that allows nation to be conflated with culture, nor culture be 
conflated with violence. It is enough that culture is a word that is virtually impossible to 
define and depends on its context for meaning, certainly when it sits in conjunction with legal 
logics.
61
 Madhavi Sunder suggests that, in certain legal contests, ‘culture’ is a system of 
power that produces content articulated by those in political power on behalf of the greater 
‘culture’. She uses various case examples from the US context to illustrate tension created 
within the structure of legal argument when one occupies the voice of cultural representative 
while being at the margins of power with respect to perceived cultural authenticity and 
representational legitimacy.
62
 This tends to further marginalise those disenfranchised subsets 
of potentially already disenfranchised groups. 
Balibar’s ‘death zones’ concept, as well as Fanon’s ‘zones of being’ and ‘non-being’, 
help us to reorient ourselves in relation to the assumptions of spaces of safety and violence 
with respect to refugee law in two ways. The concepts help us to reconfigure spatial violence 
into violence that follows particular people and subject positions from one place to another, 
which in turn draws our attention to shortcomings built into the refugee law system. 
Secondly, the concepts launch a more fundamental critique of refugee law in general, 
pointing to historical contingencies that call into question the moral basis for restrictions on 
free movement, particularly given the fact that refugee law is only available to a select and 
privileged few – those with the necessary material or political resources.63 
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4.1. The Recurring Problem of ‘Culture’ 
As the state-centred apparatuses of refugee law, international human rights and domestic 
constitutional reform are all contingent upon a rights framework of some sort, it is important 
to also critically assess the role of rights-based approaches in dealing with sex-, sexuality- 
and gender-based violence. Until refugees are given official asylum status or other similar 
residency allowance, they do not have rights of citizens, and even then they may need to wait 
some years before acquiring full political rights. This negates the drawing of full rights and 
protections along national borders and supports Balibar’s idea of the enmity line—there are 
people living in the same space under very different conditions. Extreme forms of violence 
are found within most states and are organised around relations of power, including race, 
gender, citizenship status, religion, and other separations between the ‘zones of being and 
non-being.’  
In a certain way, refugee law can be seen as bringing human rights imperialism full 
circle. The project of strengthening human rights standards through constitutional reform is 
concerned with a slightly but crucially different set of discursive practices than refugee 
protection. This difference compounds the paradox of rights. The logic of refugee protection 
is that the state is unable or unwilling to protect its citizen within its political borders, which 
sets into motion the narrative of saving the citizen-subject from her state of origin. This 
narrative locates human rights as existing within the receiving state, enabling and 
empowering logics of providing refuge to a defector at a cost. The refugee is often described 
as having escaped from a dangerous culture or condition into a better one. For many, this is 
the central function of refugee law,
64
 regulated of course by strict political and economic 
interests in the receiving countries.
6566
   
The logic of global decriminalisation of same-sex sexual activity is, in general, seen 
as a struggle for equality on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity. This struggle 
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is pitched mainly as one in favour of universal human rights, with the underlying logic that 
rights protection in countries outside of Europe will mean fewer refugees will need to cross 
borders to gain protection within Europe. This logic predominates despite the relatively small 
number of refugees that enters Europe each year, given the global migration of refugees. 
However, the focus on inequality tends to take specific form and the type of equality that is 
prioritised is quite specific—both specific to the type of rights that should be afforded as well 
as the lesser prioritisation of other interests. This approach is marked by a familiar discourse 
within LGBTIQ activist groups, one that suggests that countries can be envisioned to exist 
along a continuum of rights protections for LGBTIQ people, from criminal sanctions to 
marriage.   
Critiques of this evolutionary continuum model, which posits LGBTIQ rights as a 
discrete issue by which one can assess the relative social sophistication of a given country, 
are numerous. One significant critique is that it is at best disingenuous and likely impossible 
to disentangle the politics of sexuality from other forms of oppression, and similarly 
impossible to distinguish between local forms of oppression from transnational and 
historically contingent ones. Indeed Fanon would likely argue that racial power relations in 
colonial societies create zones regulated by violence, which exacerbates other forms of 
oppression within those zones. 
The use of rights remedies for sexuality and gender identity-related discrimination 
and violence evokes discussion regarding the role of the international community, 
particularly as regards the contested role of colonialism for many countries, including 
members of the Commonwealth. LGBTIQ people from within different local contexts are not 
necessarily approaching the issues in the same ways as certain human rights advocates from 
outside of those contexts for various reasons. One reason may be a question of strategy. For 
example, in the autumn of 2011, the United States of America and the United Kingdom 
indicated that treatment of local gay and lesbian people would be taken into account when 
determining future allocation of foreign aid to Malawi. This approach was criticised by a 
significant number of African-based NGOs, which argued that sexual minorities would 
experience violent backlash in the country as a result. This type of aid-conditioning measure 
was also subsequently warned against in the case of Uganda, where a Ugandan based human 
rights organisation implored Western activists not to call for aid-conditionality.
67
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Another key difference in approach from local actors when confronted with a global 
agenda for a particular type of right for sexual and gender minorities is that some local 
movements are rooted in a different understanding of sexuality and gender norms, and actors 
within those movements may find it difficult to articulate the local politics of sexuality 
through the framework of ‘LGBTIQ rights’ as such.68 The types of dissent from within 
different cultural systems are differently contingent—they are set at differing angles with 
respect to the political and cultural representations made by those in positions of power and 
influence, not necessarily concordant with the type of disagreement that activists and 
advocates might themselves describe from outside of the specific context.  This relates to the 
different local sexual and gender politics, and attempting to alter the relative position of those 
in a given local setting by pressing hard for universal human rights irrespective of the 
complex entanglement of sexuality with other issues is potentially to enact more violence 
upon not only sexual minorities, but all of those in the ‘zones of non-being.’   
 
4.2. The Spectre of Colonialism 
At both academic and activist conferences on LGBTIQ refugees, country conditions are 
inevitably discussed, and while in the courtroom there is no space for a discussion about local 
historical and political contingencies, colonialism features centrally in discussions among 
activists, advocates and academics outside of court. Former Justice of the High Court of 
Australia and member of the Commonwealth’s Eminent Persons Group, Michael Kirby, 
views the legal criminalization of gay sex through the historical lens of British colonial 
expansion.
69
 He notes that the Indian Penal Code, written by Macaulay, was the most copied 
code – Article 377 on Unnatural Offences, read down by the Delhi High Court70 but recently 
upheld by the Indian Supreme Court,
71
 was copied in many British territories including 
Zambia, Malaysia, Singapore and Fiji.
72
 Consensual same-sex sexual activity is, in these 
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contexts, “linked and equated to the conduct of violent sexual criminal offences.”73 The 
Griffith Penal Code written for Queensland was used in a great deal of Australia but copied in 
Papua New Guinea, Nigeria, Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania, among other places.
74
 As we 
know, similar laws exist in Botswana, Cameroon, The Gambia, Ghana, Mauritius, Jamaica 
and other territories. In forty-one of the fifty-four Commonwealth countries, according to 
Kirby, the offences remain in force.
75
   
Verdirame warns not to view western export or colonial imposition of criminal 
sanctions against lesbians and gay men as the sole reason that homophobia exists in colonized 
areas.
76
 I agree with this when, as Verdirame suggests, the issue is one of blame or support 
for the proposition of pre-colonial societies being sexual utopias. While these laws developed 
in locally-specific ways out of a common set of principles connected to colonial practices, to 
change the framing of ‘exportation of homophobia’ to more of a synthesis of a common legal 
framework across over forty countries over a few centuries is surely more concrete and more 
accurate.  This does not suggest that one should envision the pre-colonial condition free from 
sexual and gender oppression, but it acknowledges that we continue today to grapple with the 
mechanisms of colonial laws, and this fact tends to complicate the discussion around specific 
forms of oppression faced by those in colonial societies. 
 
5.  Conclusion:  The Refugee Project Reconsidered 
So what does a queer or decolonial analysis have to do with refugee claims? Perhaps these 
lenses have less to do with individual refugee claims and more to do with rethinking refugee 
law generally, and with it, freedom of movement, conceptions of extreme violence, and 
nation-state thinking. If the conventional understanding of refugee law’s purpose is to help 
victims of persecution to escape violence in one state by admitting them into another state, 
albeit through a very rigorous set of bureaucratic barriers and a potentially treacherous 
journey to new shores, we need to seriously consider in what ways this conception of 
violence artificially circumscribes, prioritises and describes certain notions of extreme 
violence (that which is construed as persecution) and not others. 
The enactors of the two strategies, increased protection of LGBTIQ refugees and 
decriminalisation, are involved in a common discussion and, many times, are the same 
people. This means that a core group of advocates has two sets of strategies in mind at the 
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same time. Such duality is nothing new to advocates and theorists who both see the limits of 
rights-based approaches while understanding the traction that rights can have in the context 
of larger social movements.
77
 As advocates for refugee protection, we should be wary of the 
argument that proliferation of universal human rights (e.g., sexuality-based rights as a global 
discourse) can and should have the ‘positive benefit’ of curtailing refugee migration into 
Europe. This argument demonises immigration generally, and once this sentiment is 
mobilized as fear, the foreseeable result is an increase of repressive measures limiting 
immigration, including administrative and economic measures that make migrating to Europe 
more difficult, not to mention the process of acquiring refugee status. This may also mean 
that we, as advocates, need to resist the rhetoric of the “bogus applicant” and the heightened 
scrutiny around credibility by painting a realistic picture of conditions in the countries of 
origin. Unmitigated by a strong sense of free movement and a much broader concept of the 
conditions of extreme violence (not merely violence that legally qualifies as persecutory) and 
its multiple contingencies, we may remain stuck in the quagmire of reifying geopolitically-
dependent understandings of extreme violence and thinking of zones of danger along 
predominantly national or cultural lines. 
We must also note that the reification of states as containers for violence and 
corresponding rights allows a bio-geo-political worldview to be instrumentalised to the 
misfortune of those groups who are disenfranchised or who do not inhabit spaces or relations 
in power within states. The concept of homonationalism in the context of refugee law makes 
a straightforward and crucial intervention in this regard. The justification of universal human 
rights along the line of a purportedly discrete rights issue plays directly into the rhetoric of 
geography, nation and culture that Fanon and Balibar critique as false structures through 
which violence is hegemonically organised. In a nutshell, focus on LGBTIQ violence as a 
cultural and geopolitical condition mutes the violence of colonialism and the ‘zones of being 
and nonbeing’ that Fanon asserts organise violence in the world, and renders invisible the 
‘superborders’ or ‘enmity lines’ that separate those who experience extreme violence and 
those who do not. This reinforces both perceptions of profound ‘cultural’ difference between 
what is colloquially termed ‘the West’ and ‘the Rest,’ without consideration of the richness of 
historical contingency and the extreme forms of violence that persist as a result. Conversely, 
heralding LGBTIQ rights as the pinnacle of social sophistication, as seen through the lens of 
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human rights, may privilege certain forms of violence over others—Western homophobia 
over non-Western homophobia, sexual violence over racial violence, sexual liberation 
struggles at any cost ‘over there’ over fighting racial, gender-based and status-based 
oppression ‘right here’ in Europe. Puar’s interpretation of sexuality being taken up to 
reinforce American national exceptionalism fits well with Balibar’s understanding of 
European citizenship as an exceptional and profoundly violent institution that serves to 
bolster European cultural and political privilege. 
Moving forward from the reflections advanced here, we might ask in what format and 
amidst what constellation of praxis a queering of refugee law might be most transformative.  
Will thinking through a lens of radical disavowal of disciplinary rules help academicians and 
legal practitioners reconfigure the sexual subject of migration law, and perhaps with it the 
legal subject in general? From within what matrix of race, migration, colonial subjectivity, 
sexuality, sex, religion or other situated identity might we envision a form of regulation 
beyond refugee law, which would do less violence upon the subject of the law while ensuring 
material safety? Is it possible to adhere to the spirit of the Geneva Convention without a 
critical focus on power and conquest of the receiving state? 
Given the interventions discussed, the first question that occurs is – where does this 
leave activists doing this work? This question is both a general question of how to do the 
work as well as a literal question of place—where might such work be done? 
One needs to challenge the basic assumptions upon which human rights are 
articulated, including our understanding of where violence is located and what constitutes 
violence, including epistemological violence. Accordingly, one needs to examine the nature 
of certain rights-based solutions to violence. Using refugee law as an example, we need to 
ask what violence refugee law is meant to preclude, whether refugee law works, at what cost, 
and whether it should be radically rethought over the long term. 
If we rely on human rights protections and the current refugee law regime, we could 
choose to do so in a way that at the very least acknowledges the death zones that Balibar 
refers to in describing violence against non-European citizens in Europe. This could 
potentially be done by granting full citizenship protections to those who are in the process of 
applying for refugee status. In the scheme of what I have discussed in this article, this is a 
cosmetic fix, but it does some work towards alleviating some of the state violence committed 
against refugees once they have landed in Europe. For example, having the right to work, full 
freedom of movement within the receiving state, and easy access to basic legal and medical 
services would be important to any person potentially fleeing persecution. In the case of 
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LGBTIQ people, very careful treatment of the credibility assessment around the applicant’s 
narrative of sexuality is essential and critical thinking about not only sexuality, but 
intersectional identity, global geopolitical power relations, and the history of colonialism 
should be considered. While taking one at her word may not be the most politically viable 
suggestion for a test of credibility, one must certainly avoid the types of exclusionary 
practices that some LGBTIQs have reported to have encountered, from intimidating or 
insensitive border guards, the lack of privacy when stating their reasons for seeking asylum, 
and judges who are incredulous of their claims because they either have children or had been 
in heterosexual relationships. That said, taking claimants’ stories at their word would perhaps 
be considered more transformative, perhaps even queer, in refusing to re-inscribe systems of 
power that stagnate other forms of systemic violence and colonial relations.  
When ‘the right to live freely and openly’ relies on credibility determination, and the 
credibility determination is a factor of the claim that is thought to go to the integrity of the 
individual who is applying for refugee status, is there an obligation on the part of recipient 
states to be profoundly deferential regarding credibility to those claiming persecution?  In the 
case of LGBTIQs, does it mean that states should not require corroborating evidence for the 
establishment of gay identity? Or, from a different angle, does the British role in 
disseminating criminal laws in any way help to tip the balance in favour of viewing these 
laws as persecutory per se?
78
  From within the comfort zone of legal rules and the traditional 
development of policy implementing those rules, it would be impossible and perhaps taboo to 
acknowledge the link on an individual basis. But should there nonetheless be a general policy 
of viewing these leftover laws as persecutory, given the recent history of empire and the 
continued existence of the Commonwealth? Could queering refugee law be one way to help 
us rethink migration or, at least, help externalize the costs of colonialism?  
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